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I. INTRODUCTION
Carter Glass, author of the Glass-Steagall Act and Secretary of Treasury under
President Wilson, once asked: "Is there any reason why the American people should be
taxed to guarantee the debts of banks, any more than they should be taxed to guarantee the
debts of other institutions, including merchants, the industries, and the mills of the
country?"1 What Glass could not have foretold were financial institutions so large and
interconnected, so deeply integrated into every facet of the global economy, that the failure
of one would trigger a crisis rivaled only by the Great Depression. It was in such an
unfathomable socio-economic and regulatory environment, some 90 years later, on a late
summer afternoon in 2008, when another Secretary of Treasury-Hank Paulson-fell to
his knees in the bowels of the U.S. Congress and begged Nancy Pelosi for a $700 billion
* Managing Director and General Counsel, The Althing Group, LLC.
** Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND POLICYMAKING: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
64 (1994) (quoting SMITH AND BEASLEY, CARTER GLASS: A BIOGRAPHY 357 (1939)).
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check with no strings attached to bail out the largest financial institutions in the United
States by guaranteeing their debts. 2 That a champion of markets, free from and uninhibited
by regulation, a man who only days before allowed a stalwart of American finance to file
bankruptcy for fear of creating "moral hazard," felt compelled to kneel before one of the
staunchest critics of deregulation, was a singular moment in the biggest, deepest financial
crisis in the United States in over 70 years.
3
A month earlier, as the crisis was unfolding, Chairman Bemanke, in a speech before
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, outlined the Federal Reserve's three-pronged
approach to the crisis. The first two prongs were traditional central bank tools: the easing
of monetary policy and offering "liquidity support" to the markets as needed. 4 The third
component-macroprudential regulation-was a multifaceted approach to the crisis that
advocated a stronger role for the Federal Reserve as a regulator. 5 Bemanke advocated for
the expansion of the regulatory system's "field of vision," including macroprudential
"oversight" in a step that would "broaden the mandate of regulators" and address systemic
risks to manage the unfolding crisis and prevent future crises from having such a deep
impact.6
The financial crisis of 2008, like the pandemic Spanish flu 90 years prior, spanned the
globe twice and caused substantial destruction. It also introduced an entirely new lexicon
of economic and regulatory terminology, such as "contagion" and "systemic shock," into
the popular and academic legal community; one such term is "macroprudential"
regulation. 7 Once an obscure term used by a select few banking economists, it now forms
the cornerstone of a vast global regulatory regime with advocates claiming that it will
prevent future systemic shocks. 8
The purpose of this Article is to examine the roots of macroprudential regulation and
its path to prominence as the next "messiah" of the financial markets. This Article presents
2. It was reported that Mr. Paulson's gesture was intended as a moment of levity in an otherwise tense
political standoff. Paulson Was Down on One Knee, Begging for a Deal, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 27, 2008),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/paulson-was-down-on-one-knee-begging-for-a-deal-
944046.html (describing negotiations between Hank Paulson and Nancy Pelosi in the wake of the crisis).
3. See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 114 (2012)
(arguing that the path of reform should involve reducing "moral hazard"); see also Iman Anabtawi & Steven L.
Schwarcz, Regulation Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REv. 75,
122-25 (2013) (defining "moral hazard" and its potential effects on the financial markets).
4. Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City's Annual Economic Symposium: Reducing Systemic Risk (Aug. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke20080822a.htm (outlining the plan of reform in the
wake of the financial crisis). It is an accepted principle of finance that systemic risk is the risk that is inherent to
the market in its entirety versus an institutional risk, which concerns a single entity or a group of entities. One can
characterize systemic risk as the common denominator possibility of loss that pervades the entirety of the financial
system of a country or global community.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Samuel Hanson et al., A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. OF ECON.
PERSPS. 3, 5-7 (2011) (offering a detailed vision of how a macroprudential regime might be designed).
8. See generally Macroprudential Policy: An Organizing Framework, INT'L MONETARY FUND &
CAPITAL MARKETS DEPARTMENT (Mar. 14, 2011), https://www.imf org/extemal/np/pp/eng/2011/03141 l.pdf
(explaining and evaluating the current use of macroprudential tools and policies).
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an overview of the challenge in the implementation of macroprudential regulation as it has
gone from a theoretical construct to a regulatory tool, its domestic and cross-border
development, and applications in the United States.9 This analysis is pertinent as it
examines the strengths and weaknesses of macroprudential regulation as currently
implemented, as well as the opportunities and threats macroprudential regulation faces,
given that it is an economic theory being ported into a regulatory environment that is beset
by social, political, and administrative roadblocks.
Part II presents a brief history of prudential regulation and an overview of
microprudential regulation and its incomplete regulatory scope. Part III examines the
spectrum that contains both micro and macroprudential regulation, with the purpose of
providing an adequate differentiation between the two areas and examining the rise of
macroprudential regulation as the choice of regulators for the mitigation of systemic
shocks. Part III presents the prudential regulatory efforts made on an international level,
analyzing the efforts of various groups prior to and after the global financial crisis of
2008.10 Part IV presents an analysis focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of
macroprudential regulation. "1
This Article posits that the success of macroprudential regulation will depend on four
factors. First, the economic philosophy of the central banker in charge of the domestic
institution with jurisdiction over macroprudential regulation will prove crucial in the
implementation of adopted regulation. If, like Chairman Greenspan, the banker is averse
to the exercise of the Central Bank's regulatory oversight authority, then no amount or
volume of policy or regulation will prevent or mitigate systemic risks and the
accompanying shocks. 12 Second, a sufficiently deep level of international cooperation is
required to mitigate regulatory arbitrage, without being so broad that the ensuing
harmonization of regulatory regimes will result in a homogenized global regulatory system
that will possibly give rise to a productization of risk and therefore a far more rapid spread
9. See Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, Macroprudential Policy-A Literature Review 3 (Bank for
International Settlements, BIS Working Paper No. 337, 2011) (discussing the usage of macroprudential policy
and macroprudential tools, the tools' relationship with monetary policy, and implementation and effectiveness);
see also Tom Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REv. 567, 569 (2014) (examining the ongoing
transformation of the financial industry and presenting a set of regulatory principles for governing the new
industry).
10. See Dirk Heremans & Katrien Bosquet, The Future of Law and Finance After the Financial Crisis: New
Perspectives on Regulation and Corporate Governance for Banks, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1551, 1554 (2011)
(stating that prudential regulation of the safety and soundness of financial intermediaries constitutes an important
domain in financial policymaking).
11. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, H.R. 4173 (July 21, 2010) (stating that its goal is to "promote the financial stability of the United
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to fail', to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for
other purposes").
12. See Javier Bianchi et al., Macroprudential Policy in a Fisherian Model of Financial Innovation, 60
IMF EcON. REv. 223,226 (2012) (studying the effects of macroprudential policy where "the pecuniary externality
is influenced by the interaction of the credit constraint with learning about the riskiness of a new financial
regime"); Monetary & Capital Mkts. Dep't, Macroprudential Policy: An Organizing Framework, INT'L
MONETARY FUND (Mar. 14, 2011), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/031411 .pdf (describing
macroprudential policy as seeking to limit systemic financial risk).
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of systemic risk and shock. 13 Third, the acceptance of macroprudential regulation by
disparate domestic regulators will require a new guiding philosophy for the financial
industry that will allow the macroprudential regulator the opportunity to meet its mandate
and provide a foundation for system-wide success. Fourth, there needs to be a sufficient
level of political willpower on the part of domestic legislatures and regulators in the face
of what may be fierce opposition to macroprudential regulation by the largest and most
politically powerful institutions the policy aims to supervise. 14 To counter this,
macroprudential regulation is primarily under the purview of the Central Bank, and
therefore less prone to regulatory or political turbulence. 15
To explore the present and possible future impact of macroprudential regulation, one
must recognize the possible implications of the current regulatory proposals. One way to
ascertain such information is to examine the strengths and weaknesses of macroprudential
regulation as it is currently proposed and implemented. As such, this Article considers the
possible opportunities and threats that lay ahead within a policy and regulatory framework
that considers the economic, political, and international implications of macroprudential
regulation proposals.
II. HISTORY OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
A. The Predominance of Microprudential Regulation
The banking and securities regulation regime in the United States has long been
designed to regulate transactions and entities, not the entirety of the financial services
industry. This regulatory structure is based on the long-held belief that a disclosure-based
system-which requires the party in possession of information to disclose, or abstain from,
trading-provides the strongest protection for investors, maintains market efficiency, and
enables capital formation. This belief system runs deep, not just in the regulation of the
securities markets but in the entirety of the financial services industry. 16 The logical
extension of this system has been a regulatory environment shaped by microprudential
regulation, and designed to manage prudential risk by focusing on individual institutions
and assessing their systemic risk potentials in the context of regulatory oversight. 17
Microprudential regulation focuses primarily on regulating institutions and
13. Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision:
Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 243, 250 (2010) (describing international governments
as active investors in private markets).
14. See Senator Jeff Merkley & Senator Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary
Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 515, 523 (2011)
(describing how banks have put proprietary trading interests ahead of their clients).
15. See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn 't), 99 GEO. L.J. 257,
275 (2011) (stating that Central Bank Governors provides a forum for banking and finance ministers from 19 of
the largest and fastest-developing economies to meet to discuss financial, economic, and monetary policy).
16. See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's New Role as Diplomatic and
Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 1315, 1320-24 (2012) (outlining the history and importance of
the disclosure regime in securities regulation).
17. See Anita 1. Anand, Is Systemic Risk Relevant to Securities Regulation?, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 941, 961
(2010) (arguing "[t]he mandate of securities regulators should be... to ensure that markets are fair, efficient, and
transparent; and to reduce systemic risk").
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transactions, thereby managing risk using a "bottom-up" approach that centers on
exogenous risk and aims to protect the consumer of the financial services-the investor
and/or depositor. 18 This regulatory system takes the view that markets are "largely
efficient" and simply require better and "more timely" disclosure to provide more
transparency to the participants. 19 In this system, a regulator's role is to collect and
disseminate information and to ensure that individual entities offering products and
services in the financial services market are not denying the end user the information
deemed necessary. As a result, the focus of this form of regulator becomes the availability
and dissemination of information, the prevention of insider trading or market abuse, and
the assurance that the market's operation continues unimpeded.
The focus on microprudential regulation through concentration on institutional risk
arose and was coupled with the deregulatory zeal that consumed the United States for
almost three decades prior to the 2008 crisis. 20 The Financial Services Modernization Act
of 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), is one example of such deregulation.
2 1
Enacted with the belief that Glass-Steagall was no longer necessary, it contributed to the
rise of an era in which financial behemoths would offer banking, brokerage, and trading
services that, when combined with new and innovative products offered by the same firms
and their proprietary trading departments, created risks heretofore unseen. 22 GLBA is also
credited with inadvertently giving birth to "too big to fail" (TBTF)-cited as one of the
primary factors that complicated and amplified the financial crisis of 2008.23
GLBA's partial repeal of Glass-Steagall positioned section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act as the "the principal statutory firewall keeping banks safe and preventing them
from being used as a cheap, publicly subsidized source of financing for potentially high-
risk business activities of their nonbank affiliates." 24 However, the Federal Reserve's (the
Fed) exercise of this power created a "false sense of security with respect to the safety and
soundness of the depository system." 25 In fact, under the stewardship of Chairman
Greenspan, the Fed pursued a distinctly deregulatory posture, asserting that markets,
governed by the best interest of the participants, are the model regulators. 26 In the
18. Claudio Borio, Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation? 2
(Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 128, 2003), http://www.bis.org/publ/work128.pdf.
19. Andrew Baker, The New Political Economy of the Macroprudential Ideational Shift, 18 NEW POL.
ECON. 112, 117 (2013).
20. See generally David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT'L
L. 685 (2012) (discussing the evolution and changes in international regulation from the late 1970s to early
2010s).
21. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106.102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999) (repealing Glass-
Stegall).
22. See Sens. Merkley & Levin, supra note 14, at 519-20 (2011) (discussing the dramatic growth of both
commercial and investment banks after the passage of GLBA).
23. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section
23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1706-29 (2011) (explaining how GLBA changed the
financial regulation system and led to increased exemptions for investment banks and financial holding
companies, which in turn contributed to the 2008 financial crisis).
24. Id. at 1776.
25. Id.
26. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html.
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aftermath of the financial crisis, Chairman Greenspan offered a meek mea culpa where he
famously told Congress in 2008: "Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of
lending institutions to protect shareholders' equity, myself included, are in a state of
shocked disbelief" 27 Perhaps he was shocked most of all to realize that objectivism is not
a regulatory philosophy.
28
B. The Incomplete Structure of Microprudential Regulatory Systems
One of the principal flaws in a microprudential system-exposed during the financial
crisis of 2008-is its failure to detect, measure, and mitigate the concept of procyclicality,
which is an inherent behavior of the financial system and amplified by a microprudential
regulatory regime. 29 According to Deputy General Manager of Bank for International
Settlements, Herv& Hannoun, procyclicality provides:
[T]he self-reinforcing mechanisms within the financial system and between the
financial system and the real economy that can exacerbate boom and bust cycles,
undermining financial and macroeconomic stability. These effects are most
prominent in the downward phase. As strains develop, previously unseen risks
materialise, deepening the retrenchment that is already under way. 30
An unimpeded market-one of the byproducts of microprudential regulation-is not
always the best regulatory approach for any market. There are times, for example during a
credit bubble, that the unimpeded functioning of the market is the very fact that leads to a
crisis, for it allows the bubble to grow without a mechanism for safe deflation.
3 1
In short, procyclicality denotes that financial institutions can develop their asset base
during an economic expansion, when the cost of capital is cheap. 32 Conversely, during an
economic contraction, when the financial health of an institution declines along with the
value of its asset base, the bank will incur higher costs in raising capital. 33 Unfortunately,
it is precisely at such a time that a microprudential system's capital buffer requirements
will create the conditions for a fire sale and further thrust the bank into illiquidity and
potential bankruptcy. 34 If the bank is a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI),
27. Id.
28. Michael Kinsley, Greenspan Shrugged, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/books/review/Kinsley-t.html.
29. See Anita Anand & Andrew Green, Regulating Financial Institutions: The Value of Opacity, 57
MCGILL L.J. 399, 406-07 (2012) (stating that microprudential systems only deal with specific and localized
issues).
30. Herv6 Hannoun, Deputy Gen. Manager, Bank for Int'l Settlements, 45th SEACEN Governor's
Conference: Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework 16-17 (Feb. 26-27, 2010), available at
www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf.
31. See Andrew K. Rose, International Financial Integration and Crisis Intensity 8 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst.,
Working Paper Series No. 341, 2012),
http://www.adbi.org/files/2012.01.25.wp34l.intl.financial.integration.crisis.intensity.pdf (demonstrating that
unregulated markets often lead to more issues).
32. Paul A. Volcker & Jacob A. Frenkel, Enhancing Financial Stability Resilience, Macroprudential
Policy, Tools, and Systems for the Future, GROUP OF THIRTY 29-30 (Oct. 2010), available at
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/MacroprudentiaLReportFinal.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 32 (arguing the importance of macropnidential systems to procyclicality recovery).
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then the problem is suddenly systemic and institutional. In other words, "[t]his bias toward
overliquidation engendered by microprudential financial regulatory policy is a source of
unnecessary downward pressure throughout the banking system on the value of assets,
leading to potentially catastrophic increases in systemic risk and financial contagion."
3 5
This weakness in the manner in which markets perform-leading to buying high and
selling low-is a primary target of macroprudential regulation.
This structural flaw extended to global regulatory regimes that espoused a
microprudential view of risk. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III Accords, the
financial regulatory regimes around the world were primarily concerned with exogenous
risk. 36 The underlying theory was based on the premise that by managing risk at an
institutional level, systemic risk would be adequately mitigated. After several banking
crises, however, the United States, the G20, and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS), gave macroprudential regulation the center stage.
37
III. THE EVOLUTION OF MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION
The term macroprudential policy was coined in the late 1970s, perhaps at a meeting
of the Cooke Committee. 38 In the beginning, the term was used to describe concerns over
disproportionate transnational lending. 39 These concerns grew to include financial product
innovation and eventually the issue of procyclicality. 40 Macroprudential regulation gained
widespread acceptance among central bankers in the 1990s and 2000s, in the midst of a
series of financial crises.4 1 It rose to prominence as the optimal system to achieve the goal
of preventing and/or containing systemic financial crises in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis.
The characteristics of a macroprudential regulatory system are in part contradictory
and in part complementary to that of a microprudential system. Macroprudential regulation
is viewed as a yin to the yang of microprudential regulation-a necessary set of tools that
aims to manage systemic risk within the rapidly growing and ever-interconnected global
financial system.4 2 Macroprudential policy is decidedly opaque. Scholars thus provide a
35. Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99 GEO. L.J. 1615,
1615 (2011).
36. Narissa Lyngen, Basel III: Dynamics ofState Implementation, 53 HARv. INT'L L.J. 519,534-35 (2012).
See generally Marianne Ojo, Basel III-Responses to Consultative Documents, Vital Aspects of the Consultative
Process and the Journey Culminating in the Present Framework (Part 2), 30 No. 10 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES
POL'Y REP. 15 (2011).
37. See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT TO G20 FINANCE MINISTERS
AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS ON BASEL III IMPLEMENTATION (Oct. 2012), available at
www.bis.org/publlbcbs234.pdf.
38. Piet Clement, The Term "'Macroprudential": Origins and Evolution, BIS Q. REV. 59, 59 (2010).
39. Id. at 59-61.
40. Id. at 63 (describing various international lending concerns of the time). Procyclicality references the
tendency of financial variables to fluctuate around a trend during an economic cycle.
41. See Andrew Baker, The New Political Economy of the Macroprudential Ideational Shift, 18 NEW POL.
ECON. 112, 119 (2012) (explaining how macroprudential ideas have grown in prominence after the most recent
financial crisis).
42. Id. at 115.
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description of the policy by way of objectives, tools, and metrics.
43
In 2003, Claudio Borio stated that macroprudential regulation's objective is to "limit
the risk of episodes of financial distress with significant losses in terms of the real output
for the economy as a whole." 44 This definition is sufficiently expansive to grant
policymakers the needed scope to better define specific goals to counter the pattern of
systemic financial crises that have been present since the 1970s, while being
simultaneously narrow enough so as to exclude many of the smaller and more limited
financial crises of the past.45 The definition is contingent upon the measure of a significant
loss to the real national output, as determined by economists and policymakers. This loss,
also known as the output gap, is the difference between the actual GDP of a country versus
its potential GDP.
Macroprudential regulation's banking origins impart context for its recent rise to
prominence. Its goal is to provide balance in the regulatory regime that oversees the
financial sector to mitigate the perceived weaknesses of a microprudential regulatory
system. 46 Macroprudential regulation functions as an early warning system, 47 consisting
of a collection of tools, the most important of which are best defined by their primary
function-oversight of the financial system to prevent the accumulation of risk.
Macroprudential regulation evaluates endogenous risk in light of system-wide distress
factors to prevent output costs to the economy at large. 4 8 As a metric of regulatory
oversight, endogenous risk is an especially important concept. 49 Financial systems-
especially in a post-crisis environment-are viewed as inherently vulnerable, containing
many system-wide internal unseen risks that can be laid bare by a shock that could be either
internal or external. 50 It is this vulnerability that lends credence to macroprudential
regulation as a powerful tool.
5 1
43. See, e.g., Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to Regulating
Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881 (2013) (mentioning that macroprudential regulation focuses on the
interconnectedness of financial institutions, and by demanding that institutions use qualitative tools that measure
capital requirements needed for surviving financial shocks).
44. Borio, supra note 18, at2.
45. See Ricardo J. Caballero & Pablo Kurlat, The "Surprising" Origin and Nature of Financial Crises: A
Macroeconomic Policy Proposal 4 (MIT Dep't of Econ., Working Paper, No. 09-24, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1473918 (proposing a new financial instrument, tradable
insurance credits, that would provide flexible protections to the financial market).
46. See HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM,
Cm. 8012, at 35-36 (2011), available at https://www.gov.uk/govemment/consultations/a-new-approach-to-
financial-regulation-building-a-stronger-system (describing the interaction between Britain's micro and
macroprudential financial risk-assessment systems).
47. There is significant debate on even the use of the word "regulation" in conjunction with
"macroprudential," with some scholars arguing that macroprudentialism only rises to the level of policy. For the
purpose of this article, macroprudential policy and macroprudential regulation will be used interchangeably.
48. See Clement, supra note 38, at 65 (extrapolating the challenge of creating objective analytical tools to
allow regulators to predict world market risks).
49. See Borio, supra note 18, at 188-89 (stating how individual failures spread through the financial
system).
50. See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 327 (2010) (arguing that
the cross-border sale of securities expose all markets to the risks of individual firm failure).
51. See Volcker & Frenkel, supra note 32 (demanding that a powerful macroprudential regulatory regime
be put in place).
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Macroprudential policy aims to prevent a systemic shock to the economy that would
produce an output gap that is larger than that produced by a recession caused by the normal
cyclical forces in the economy. 52 As such, a macroprudential regulator's mandate would
not require an overly interventionist approach to the financial markets, but rather the design
and implementation of a system that requires banks-and other regulated entities-to
anticipate the actions they need, and to take the requisite prompt corrective action to
comply with the regulation. 
53
Academically, the components of macroprudential regulation are (1) capital
conservation and (2) countercyclical buffers.5 4 Capital conservation focuses on enhancing
the capital requirements of bank holding companies and systemically important nonbank
financial institutions, especially those operating on a global scale. 55 Countercyclical
buffers, meanwhile, provide for constraints on capital during periods of rapid credit growth
in order to prevent or mitigate the buildup of risk in the system.
56
In implementation, macroprudential regulation requires a robust regulatory regime
that includes a macroprudential toolkit, 57 which provides the opportunity for both
52. See generally Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: Complexity, Causation,
Law, and Judgment, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 299 (2010) (explaining the causes of the 2008 financial crisis).
53. See Samuel Hanson et al., A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP.
3, 10 (2011) (discussing the idea of prompt corrective action, including the notion that corrective action targeted
at dollars of capital can achieve the same regulatory goals as targeting capital ratios but in a less-interventionalist
manner).
54. See generally Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REv. 657 (2012) (describing a macroprudential approach to regulating systemtic risk).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Anil K. Kashyap et al., The Macroprudential Toolkit, 59 9MF EcON. REv. 145, 145 (2011) (defining
a macroprudential toolkit as multiple regulatory devices). Scholars have proposed that the formula for
measurement of institutional risk must also be changed. Jim Chen, Postmodern Disaster Theory 33 (Mich. State
Univ. Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 11-17, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract -id=2141591. This formula known as value at risk (VAR) has
been criticized in the past, and it is presented that a new formula measuring the expected shortfall (ES) should
replace VAR. John Hull, VAR Versus Expected Shortfall, RISK MAGAZINE (Mar. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/technical-paper/1506669/var-versus-expected-shortfall. It is folly to believe
that by simply switching a formula that is supposed to measure the risk of tail events, the world can now sleep
easy and not worry about the next crisis. There are five reasons behind this assertion. First, VAR-and its
variants-functioned well prior to the crisis, and their failure to predict the equity shortfall is not necessarily
rooted in the design of the model, but in the inputs used to calculate risk variability. A financial model's results
are entirely dependent upon the skill and knowledge of the user and quality of the data economists input into the
model. Nevertheless, these economists rarely agree, and most are often wrong by a degree of variance that if
applied to a tail event prediction, would render that prediction completely useless. Chen, supra, at 64. The folly
of expecting perfection from financial and economic forecasting models is in not the math, but rather everything
that surrounds it. Second, expected shortfall, as a tool of measuring asset portfolio risk, remains untested in crisis,
and it may not be wise to test it during the next "inside job." The primary problem with the BCBS moving away
from VAR lies not in the accuracy-or lack thereof-of VAR itself, but in the human desire to put up a "under
new management" sign after every seismic shift in order to convey a message that there is action being taken to
ameliorate the perceived problems with the previous management. This tendency often results in the rushed
adoption of new and untested methodologies, that, only years later-in the face of a future crisis-will prove to
be insufficient. This problem is especially acute in the case of tail events, where the degree of confidence in the
predictive capacity of any model remains in question-both mathematically and pragmatically. Third, the speed
and globalization of markets renders any risk modeling that presumes a national or regional system significantly
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regulators and central bankers to better observe the ebbs and tides in systemic risk, and
thus be able to prevent and/or mitigate any systemic crises.
58
A. An Overview of International Prudential Regulation
Macroprudential regulation is presented as a crucial aspect of systemic monitoring.
Without the system-wide tools providing sufficiently early warning, no global economy
can adequately manage systemic risk. 59 This notion has been accepted and enshrined in
the United States, Europe, and much of the global regulatory system. 60 Integral to the
vulnerable to error. There is a common fallacy that because of modem computer hardware and software, financial
modeling has significantly advanced and is able to account for and mitigate speed and globalization. Chen, supra,
at 35. In fact, computers-with rare exceptions that are used in military and academic settings-do not have the
ability to develop new financial models; nor do they have the ability to fully test any theoretical models against
heretofore unknown future set of facts that may lead to the next crisis. Furthermore, given that the data across
national and market boundaries tends to lack the uniformity and cohesion necessary for such end tail calculations,
it is impracticable to develop a risk model that fully accounts for international variability. See BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL STANDARDS: A REPORT TO G20 LEADERS ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL III REGULATORY REFORMS 10-11 (Nov. 2014), available at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d299.pdf (discussing inconsistencies in implementation of the Basel Ill program
and noting that the differences "tend to be driven by specific local circumstances"). While banking regulation
under the Basel accords, especially the more specific and restrictive capital requirements of Basel 111, are fairly
harmonized, central banks still maintain significant authority over their domestic banking systems. Id. This
autonomy provides the opportunity for future SIFIs, or a collection of seemingly smaller banks that act in unison
as a SIFI equivalent, to skirt the rules. Fourth, and this argument may seem overly simplistic, no two systemic
crises are identical insofar as their origins, triggers, contagions and underlying structures. Systemic crises are
similar to flu epidemics. While all flus function in the same manner (as an upper respiratory infection), they do
not attack or replicate in the same manner, and they require different antibodies to kill them. This is why until a
virus is recognized and genetically mapped, it is impossible to develop a vaccine for it. By the same token,
changing the formula for measuring the risk of a tail event, by the virtue of the failure of a previous formula to
predict a previous tail event, is akin to saying that more lifeboats for the Titanic will have prevented the
Hindenburg disaster. Finally, the fifth reason that switching from VAR to ES may prove to be much ado about
nothing is the human element involved in each crisis. Alluded to throughout the first four reasons, mathematics
is only as good as the human beings utilizing and interpreting the results of the financial model. Therein lies the
paradox of scientific advancement. Risk measurement is not akin to Newton developing an entirely new branch
of mathematics to explain his theories. It is merely a set of statistical tools to address the likelihood of rare events,
depending on variable inputs. So, if the outcome depends on the input, then human control over the input becomes
the single point of failure that may render the entire endeavor fruitless. Statistical modeling is especially
susceptible to this problem, due to the fact that humans can select the data input into the model, and the
introduction of selection bias can negate the benefits of the model.
58. Tobias Adrian, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Presentation at OFR-FSOC Inaugural Conference: The
Macroprudential Toolkit: Discussion of "New Models of the Economy and the Financial System" by Charles
Goodhardt and Dimitri Tsomocos, (Dec. 2, 2011) available at http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/wsr/Documents/OFR-Adrian.pdf; see also Lewis Alexander, U.S. Chief Economist, Nomura Securities
International Inc.: Macro Prudential Toolkit: Measurement and Analysis: Measurement and Analysis, Financial
Stability Risk Measurement, (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/OFR-
Alexander.pdf (analyzing growth of financial crises).
59. See generally Michael M. Hutchison et al., A Brief Review of Literature on the Effectiveness of
International Capital Controls, 29 ASIAN DEV. REV. 1 (2012) (reviewing regulation on international capital).
60. The European Systemic Risk Board: From Institutional Foundation to Credible Macroprudential
Oversight, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (Apr. 1, 2012), available at http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/
EN/Downloads/Publications/Monthly-ReportArticles/2012/2012_04_esrb.pdf~jsessionid=OOO0VBv_5 IEug4aT
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success of macroprudential regulation is an adequate international foundation, including
the Basel Accords and the steps taken by International Organization of Securities
Commissioners (IOSCO) and the G20.61 An international regulatory system must consider
the varying legal, cultural and economic foundations of each nation-state, and thus it is
slow to advance. International prudential regulation has, thus far, taken the form of bi- or
multilateral agreements and contains general frameworks to account for the vast cultural,
legal, and social differences among the member states of the organization adopting the
agreement. 62 This foundation includes the Basel Accords; IOSCO's statement of
objectives and principles and its Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU);
as well as the G20's recent establishment of the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
63
As with any idea in this conversion from theory to practice, however, the details
present challenges. 64 This is particularly pertinent to any economic theory that portends to
become a foundational solution for the mitigation or prevention of global systemic crises.
The main issue remains the promulgation and adoption of rules based on legislative efforts.
In order to better understand these potential pitfalls, the analysis must begin with prudential
regulatory efforts prior to the 2008 global financial crisis.
1. International Prudential Regulation Prior to 2008
In the past few decades, prudential regulation has required international cooperation
among central banks and securities regulators. 6 5 The increasing global presence of various
TiGIZMGwjNN:-I?-blob=publicationFile. See generally Rosa M. Lastra, The Evolution of the European
Central Bank, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1260 (2012) (exploring the functions and the objectives of the European
Central Bank as a means to strengthen financial stability in Europe).
61. See Hannoun, supra note 30 (advocating the cooperation of banks and supervisory agencies in achieving
global financial stability).
62. While many have pondered the possibility of a truly global financial regulatory regime, professor Chris
Brummer argues that the future belongs not to global agreements but to smaller cohorts that move forward to
dominate the regulatory landscape. See generally CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES,
SOFT LAW AND FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (Cambridge University
Press, 2014). His is an interesting perspective that argues that moving forward-at least for the foreseeable
future-international action will take place in fits and starts, and in small groups of nations rather than grand
multilateral organizations or among large groups of state actors. Id.
63. See generally Jose Vinals, Financial Counselor and Director, International Monetary Fund, Remarks at
G-20 Reform Initiatives: Lessons Learned from Regulatory and Supervisory Responses to the Crisis (Nov. 11,
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2009/111109.htm (discussing the effect of the
international financial crisis, specifically those from regulatory agencies).
64. See Philip Aldrick, Eurozone Will Suffer if Brussels Controls Banking, Says FSA Boss, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (UK) (Apr. 27, 2012), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9230309/Letting-
Brussels-regulate-banks-would-deepen-EU-instability-wams-FSA-chairman-Lord-Tumer.btmI (advocating
against allowing Brussels further banking regulatory authority); see also Philip Aldrick, Letting Brussels Regulate
Banks Would Deepen EU Instability, Warns FSA Chairman Lord Turner, TELEGRAPH ONLINE (UK), (Apr. 27,
2012), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9230309/Letting-Brussels-regulate-banks-
would-deepen-EU-instability-wams-FSA-chairman-Lord-Tumer.htm (discussing remarks made by the
Financial Services Authority Chairman Lord Turner on newly proposed banking regulations); Christos
Hadjiemmanuil, European Monetary Union, The European System of Central Banks, and Banking Supervision:
A Neglected Aspect of the Maastricht Treaty, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 105 (1997) (discussing the relationship
between the Maastricht Treaty and European financial regulatory institutions).
65. See Douglas W. Amer, Adaptation and Resilience in Global Financial Regulation, 89 N.C. L. REv.
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financial institutions has created the problem of regulatory arbitrage in a manner not
possible before digital markets became a ubiquitous feature of the financial landscape. It is
the digitization of capital and globalization of risk that, when combined with increasing
size, poses a significant burden to risk management.
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the precursor to the Financial Stability Board,
is an example of an attempt at what may be termed pseudo-macroprudential regulation.
The FSF ascended to the forefront of the global financial regulatory scene, aiming to
succeed where the IMF had supposedly failed. Established in the aftermath of the 1997
Asian financial crisis, the FSF's goal was to serve as an early warning system designed to
shine a light on the "vulnerabilities" in the financial sector.66 In fact, the Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP), an International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank
initiative, is associated with the FSF and "designed to monitor and assess financial stability
on a country by country basis." 67 The IMF's failure to predict the financial crises of the
late 1990s in Asia is evidence of its regulatory shortcomings of the time and a narrow view
of risk. This history underscores an integral query about whether a broader macroprudential
regulatory entity is capable of accomplishing a feat that multiple other entities and groups
have failed to accomplish.
In addition to the FSB, IOSCO has maintained systemic risk mitigation as one of its
three main principles, the other two being investor protection and market fairness. 68 More
specifically, IOSCO has required measures related to capital, collateral, and corporate
governance for central counterparty clearance in the derivative markets. Furthermore, in
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, IOSCO members have begun to regard the
organization as more essential to monitoring and managing systemic risk than ever
before. 69 However, IOSCO is an international body comprised of members from varying
countries. Thus, the speed at which IOSCO is capable of amending and enhancing its
multilateral memorandum of understanding, given that it must reach compromise and
accord from its member states, is problematic.
Supervisory colleges are another risk management organizational tool with prudential
regulatory functions that have become somewhat popular in the past two decades. 70 First
used in the aftermath of the BCCI scandal in the late 1980s, they gained momentum after
1579, 1580 (2011) (discussing the evolution of international regulatory cooperation in response to global financial
crises). See generally Franklin Allen & Richard Herring, Presentation at Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania Asian Development Bank Institute/Wharton Financial Institutions Center Conference on Financial
Regulation, Securities Markets Versus Banks, and Crisis Prevention: Banking Regulation Versus Securities
Market Regulation (July 11, 2001), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-allenf/download/Vita/
0129.pdf (comparing contemporary banking and securities market regulation).
66. Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability
Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation?, 32 U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 488, 489-90
(2009).
67. Cally Jordan, The Dangerous Illusion of International Financial Standards and the Legacy of the
Financial Stability Forum, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 333, 336 (2011).
68. See generally Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 55 (2011) (discussing models of transnational financial regulatory networks).
69. Jordan, supra note 67, at 361-62.
70. Duncan Alford, Supervisory Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and Improving International
Supervisory Coordination, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 57, 77-79 (2010).
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the 2008 financial crisis. 7 1 As Duncan Alford states: "Even before the current crisis,
supervisory authorities were utilizing colleges as a tool to share prudential information on
financial institutions with cross-border operations." 72 Their use is particularly important
in the European Union, where supervisory colleges monitor the activities of the member
states. 73 Although mainly viewed as organizational tools, these colleges have gained
renewed interest as a way of heading off multinational banking crises by allowing the
college to disseminate information faster and monitor SIFIs in a more coordinated
manner. 74
Although many international bodies have attempted to address prudential regulation
on an international scope, BCBS was formed in direct response to a microprudential crisis
in 1974, and the Basel I and II Accords were rooted in the collective desire of central
bankers to avoid systemic risk. 75 Central banks adopted Basel I in 1988, and only
addressed "credit risk."' 76 This round of Basel accords contained a rudimentary
characterization of bank assets, and classified them into two tiers, divided into various
categories based on their liquidity and risk weight. 77 Basel I stands upon four pillars: 1)
the constituents of capital, 2) risk weighting, 3) a target standard ratio, and 4) transitioning
and implementing agreements. 7 8 These pillars were the outcome of a regulatory
harmonization goal on the part of Basel I, to level the playing field for banks that operated
across their borders and competed for the same loans. 79 The primary idea of Basel I was
that international banks with large holdings, and potential for systemic impact, would have
to measure their assets by the same rules, and set aside the same amount of capital.
80
Risk weighting, which viewed domestic currency and debt as lowest risk and therefore
provided a favorable treatment, proved to be a fatal flaw in Basel 1.81 Another flaw in the
design of Basel I led to its capital adequacy requirements only addressing the credit risk
for a bank's loan-book. 8 2 Before Basel I there were no capital requirements to manage
risks associated with fluctuations in exchange rates, interest rates and macroeconomic
71. Id. at 59-62. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCD was an international bank, with over
$20 billion in assets, whose failure is one of the largest in history. Id. at 59. Proven to be a corrupt enterprise,
BCCI's spectacular downfall is-to this day--cited as a prime example of regulatory failure and the need for
more systemic oversight. Id. at 59-60.
72. Id. at 58.
73. Alford, supra note 70, at 62.
74. Id. at 62-64.
75. Sandra Rutova, Revisiting the Basel Accords: Lessons Learned From the Credit Crisis, 19 U. MIAmI
Bus. L. REV. 83, 84-85 (2011).
76. Id.
77. See Bryan J. Balin, Basel , Basel H and Emerging Markets: A Nontechnical Analysis (2008), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1477712 (discussing generally the development,
implementation, and problems associated with the Basel I criteria).
78. Id. at 3-4.
79. Rutova, supra note 75, at 85-86.
80. See Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial
Stability, 49 ECON. STUD. 259, 264-5 (2003) (arguing that regulatory and supervisory independence is important
for financial stability).
81. Balin, supra note 77, at 3.
82. Rutova, supra note 75, at 95-96.
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conditions. 83 This structure formed the basis for the subsequent criticism of Basel I, which
focused on the accord's narrow scope, limited implementation, and finally the "misaligned
incentives" that the accord provides to banks by essentially encouraging them to take on
risks that were not classified and measured by the accord.
84
In 1999, BCBS-largely in response to the banking crises of the 1990s-proposed
what was supposed to be a "new and improved" and far-reaching capital adequacy accord.
Formally known as A Revised Framework on International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, Basel II divided risk into categories in an effort to
better mitigate systemic risk by providing rules for credit, operational and market risk. 85
The theory behind this classification of risk was that as asset classes changed, risk factors-
both on an institutional and macroeconomic level-remained stable over time. 86
Basel II's implementation of risk monitoring, however, was left to credit rating
agencies, Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs), which were
tasked to opine on the "creditworthiness" of products and companies governed under Basel
11. 87 This accord engendered a false sense of security among regulators and central bankers
by relying too heavily on credit rating agencies. 88 The impact of Basel II on the 2008
financial crisis left important questions that mandate an inquiry into whether the three pillar
foundations of the accord contributed to and accelerated the crisis, or whether the
framework was simply too outmoded and fragile to help prevent the crisis. 89
Specifically, the procyclical design of Basel I has received much criticism as one of
its primary weaknesses, creating "cascading increases in the decline of asset values" 90 that
would lead to disastrous consequences. 9 1 One negative outcome is the fire sale that must
occur under liquidity rules when an asset's value is marked to market, and the bank is
forced to dispose of that asset at the lowest possible value, and most likely the worst
possible economic climate.
92
Basel II's main attempt at shoring up the weaknesses of its predecessor was in its
83. Joshua N. Rudin, Basel III. The Banking Band-Aid?, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 621, 621
(2012).
84. Balin, supra note 77, at 5.
85. Id. at 6.
86. See id. at 6-7 (discussing Pillar I of Basel 11).
87. See Credit Rating Agencies and Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs),
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (noting
that although II NRSROs are named by the SEC, only three are regarded as the major agencies).
88. See Aline Darbellay & Frank Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 30 BANKING
& FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1, 2 (2011) (discussing the impact of credit rating agencies after Dodd-Frank).
89. See generally Misa Tanaka, The Macroeconomic Implications of the New Basel Accord, 49 ECON.
STUD. 217 (2003) (explaining the shortcomings of the Basel 11 accords).
90. Jeffery Atik, Basel 11: A Post-Crisis Post-Mortem, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 731, 752
(2011).
91. See Matthew J. Eichner et al., Financial Statistics for the United States and the Crisis: What Did They
Get Right, What Did They Miss, and How Should They Change?, DIVISION OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS &
MONETARY AFFAIRS, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD 20-28 (Apr. 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201020/201020pap.pdf (arguing that to best prevent another
financial crisis financial data must be used in a specialized and specific way).
92. Mark J. Welshimer, Capital and Liquidity Regulation and Reform-An Update, 1920 PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE 127 (2011).
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standardized approach to credit risk. 93 As part of the first pillar of Basel It, certain
"authorized" credit rating agencies were given the authority to rate sovereign debt. Basel
II's risk weighting methodology assigns a weight of 0% to debt rated AAA to AAA-, 20%
to A+ to A-, and so forth down to B- debt rated at 150%. Thus came the main criticism that
Basel II provides a "false sense of security." 9 4 Atik notes that Basel II "acceded to the
credence that banks inevitably know their risk exposures and know how to manage risks
better than their regulators."
9 5
2. Movement Towards Macroprudential Regulation After 2008
In November 2009, the G20 called on BCBS to issue stronger prudential standards.
9 6
BCBS's efforts led to the draft and adoption of Basel III in 2010-11.97 Basel III is the chief
promoter of macroprudential regulation in the international community. 
9 8
The G20, through the latest Basel Accord (Basel III), have outlined various goals for
systemic risk monitoring that synchronize with the academic goals of macroprudential
regulation. From a regulatory standpoint, macroprudential regulation aims to: 1) prevent
and/or contain systemic shocks to the financial system; 2) supervise SIFIs and their risk
accumulation; 3) provide a conservation buffer above and beyond the rules prior to the
2008 financial crisis; and 4) provide for countercyclical measures that mitigate the
procyclical policies of prior regulatory mandates, thus allowing for more flexibility in the
system.99 This factor allows SIFIs to expand reserves during an economic expansion and
reduce reserves amidst a contraction.
93. See W. Ronald Gard, George Bailey in the Twenty-First Century: Are We Moving to the Postmodern
Era in International Financial Regulation with Basel 11?, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 161, 163 (2006)
(stating that the changes instituted by Basel I were quickly outgrown and that the two-tiered approach of Basel II
would be better utilized by the international financial system).
94. Atik, supra note 90, at 749.
95. Id.
96. Alford, supra note 70, at 75.
97. Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, and
Lessons for Emerging Markets 9-10 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 392, 2012), available at
http://www.eaber.org/sites/default/files/documents/2012.10.29.wp392.dodd .frank_.act_.basel_.iii_.emerging.m
arkets.pdf.
98. See Hannoun, supra note 30 (discussing the role of central banks in the implementation and oversight
of Basel Ill).
99. Id. See Peter King & Heath Tarbert, Basel IlT An Overview, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVIS. POL'Y REP.
1 (2011) (explaining that the departure from micro to macroprudential measures was to better address systemic
financial risks at the global level). See also Andrew W. Lo & Thomas J. Brennan, Do Labyrinthine Legal Limits
on Leverage Lessen the Likelihood of Losses? An Analytical Framework, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1775, 1784-89 (2012)
(Basel III updates previous accords by specifically incorporating two primary drivers of macroprudential
regulation. First, Basel III adopts countercyclical capital measures to dampen the procyclical effects of other
regulation and, more specifically, to help mitigate the hidden impact of procyclical tendencies of firms that go
unnoticed in the expansion phase of an economic cycle. The second major enhancement to the Basel Accords
materializes in the embracing of liquidity buffers to address the insufficient capital requirements that led to the
financial crisis of 2008. Basel II significantly modifies capital requirements at all tiers and introduces leverage
ratios to assist large institutions in maintaining their financial health in both expansionary and recessionary
periods.). See generally Randall D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform, 2010
BYU L. REv. 421 (2010) (detailing that the Basel III adopted a broad set of regulatory reforms to combat market
instability following the 2008 financial crisis).
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As a preliminary, but all-important, first step, Basel III adopts a new, stricter definition
of capital for regulated entities. 100 BCBS found that the credit crisis of 2008-which is
arguably only a portion of the overall crisis--could have been largely avoided with this
new definition. 101 These changes primarily address the "size and quality" of common
equity tier 1 (CETI) capital. 102 At the time of the crisis, Basel rules allowed 15% of CET1
capital to consist of "hybrid capital instruments" which contributed significantly to the
asset devaluation of the banks. 103 Hybrid capital instruments became a leading indicator
of the credit crunch that followed. 10 4 Such capital is to be phased out by Basel III. Basel
III's tier 1 and tier 2 capital are basically defined as "going concern capital" and "gone
concern capital." The latter is used in liquidation and bankruptcy, while the former is used
in the operation of the bank. 105
While stringent capital rules are the cornerstone of Basel III, this latest accord has also
taken significant steps to mitigate the procyclical impact of Basel 11. 106 Countercyclical
measures can provide a smoothing effect on the risk curve experienced by various
institutions, and indeed act to curb their appetite for risk in the boom phase of a cycle. This
will not be achieved immediately upon execution, especially given the fact that a financial
institution's appetite for risk is higher with the growth of the institution and the economy.
Over the long term, however, macroprudential regulation's countercyclical reforms will
help the financial services industry realize the ultimate benefits of reduced risk in the form
of longevity in the life cycle of its products, and continued and more stable profitability. 107
Another international step towards a more macroprudential-centered regulatory
framework is the G20's establishment of the FSB, in 2009, as the successor of the
aforementioned FSF. 108 Its goal is to provide the foundation for financial reform, with four
approaches: "(1) strong regulatory controls; (2) effective supervision; (3) enhanced
methods for addressing resolution and systemic institutions; and (4) transparent
100. Rudin, supra note 83, at 623.
101. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, para. 6 (Dec.
2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf [hereinafter BASEL III]. (Basel III was revised to finalize
the treatments of counterparty credit risk in bilateral trades and re-released in June 2011).
102. Blair Keefe & Andrew Pfleiderer, Basel III: What ItMeansfor the Global Banking System, 27 BANKiNG
& FN.L.REv. 407, 410 (2012).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. BASEL III, supra note 101, at 12.
106. See Hans Gersbach & Jan Wenzelburger, The Workout of Banking Crisis: A Macroeconomic
Perspective, 49 ECON. STUD. 233, 233 (2003) (arguing "strict enforcement of capital adequate rules suffices in
prosperous periods").
107. See Angela Monaghan, Banks Urgently Need to Raise More Capital, Says BoE, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar.
23, 2012, 10:09 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9162329/Banks-
urgently-need-to-raise-more-capital-says-BoE.html (arguing British banks should raise capital to reduce risk).
108. See Arie C. Eerisse, Note, Banking on Cooperation: The Role of the G-20 in Improving the
International Financial Architecture, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 239, 239 (2012) (discussing how G20's
establishment of the Financial Stability Board improved international financial architecture); John Eatwell, Paper
Presented at the Western Economic Association International Conference: The Challenges Facing International
Financial Regulation 14 (July 4-8, 2001), available at http://www.financialpolicy.org/DSCEatwell.pdf (arguing
for a strong global authority with the authority to monitor and enforce international standards).
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international assessment and peer review." 109 The FSB has a lofty mandate that proposes
"to enhance cooperation among the various national and international supervisory bodies
and international financial institutions so as to promote stability in the international
financial system." 110 The immediate, primary problem for the FSB will be credibility.
Essentially, the FSB suffers a branding problem; the FSB merely is a renamed version of
the FSF. As early as 2001, the FSF was called a "think tank with nowhere to go." 111 It
remains to be seen whether the board can succeed where the forum failed. 
112
B. Prudential Regulation in the United States
1. Prudential Regulation Prior to 2008
Prudential regulation prior to the 2008 financial crisis-around the globe-focused
on institutional risk, as evidenced by the fact that even the Basel I and II Accords addressed
systemic risk from a microprudential perspective. In the United States, the Federal Reserve
had final prudential authority over banks, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) carrying resolution authority over all
banking institutions. 113 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity
109. Ernisse, supra note 108, at 240-41.
110. Jose Vinals, Financial Counselors and Director, International Monetary Fund, Remarks at G20 Reform
Initiatives, Seoul, Korea: Lessons Learned from Regulatory and Supervisory Responses to the Crisis, (Nov. 11,
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/extema1Inp/speeches/2009/111109.htm.
111. Eatwell, supra note 108, at 14.
112. The Brookings Institution has proposed to elevate the FSB to a treaty institution. DOMENICO
LOMBARDI, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE GOVERNANCE OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD 15 (2011),
available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2011/9/23 %20financial%20stability/ 20board%2Olom
bardi/fsbissues paperjlombardi.pdf. However, the proposal by the Brookings Institution to establish the FSB as
a treaty institution is untenable. Treaties-especially in the fast evolving field of finance-could prove useless,
because new products can be designed to circumvent the treaty language. Treaties can also be watered down. As
such, the proposal to elevate the FSB to the status of a treaty organization is fraught with peril. The global financial
system, while vast, continues to evolve rapidly with basic securities, derivatives, and other financial instrments
regulated under varying structures by different regimes. Even domestically, which regulator in the United States
will be tasked with the implementation of hypothetical treaty mandates under the FSB? Another reason that the
treaty proposal for the FSB is unwarranted is the fractured nature of domestic and international relations. The
following is a different approach for the new FSB (which is for all intents and purposes a top-down organization):
the implementation of a two-part strategy in inviting members and providing access to and expanding its audience.
Part one would grant membership to countries based on the size of the economy-provided the economy meets
certain factors. For example, Iran's economy has no financial sector of consequence and is currently subject to
severe international sanctions, so it would not receive an invitation. Countries that are not invited would be
eligible to join based on certain objective, measureable and verifiable criteria. Part two would grant membership
using a three-part test. (1) How fast is the economy growing, and how fast has it grown in the past decade? Rapidly
developing countries pose both an opportunity and a threat to the global economy. Their continued, stable growth
provides an opportunity for their own population and the world, while a sudden financial shock would not only
destabilize the country, but also its trading and financial partners. (2) The country must have a measurably robust
financial services sector. (3) The country must have a strong financial regulator, or plans institute one that is able
to implement international mandates.
113. See generally Michele Cea, The Regulatory Powers of the Federal Reserve and of the European Central
Bank in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of2007-2009, 2 CREIGHTON INT'L & COMP. L.J. 54 (2011) (examining
the "newly expanded functions" of the Fed and EBC in the new roles of "ensuring financial stability, carrying out
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Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) both maintained prudential regulatory authority and
the necessary mandates regarding the institutions they supervised. These measures were
primarily aimed at the exchanges and other clearing entities, with focus on customer fund
segregation and minimum capital requirements in order to prevent contagion to the market-
at-large. The Fed, which is arguably the institution ideally suited for macroprudential
regulation, had a dual mandate that did not appear to include any systemic risk
regulation. 114 While the argument could be put forth that the primary monetary policies of
the Fed acted as the best macroprudential regulatory tool available, the institution itself
was neither geared toward nor focused on systemic risk regulation.
2. Post-Crisis Prudential Regulation in the United States: Dodd-Frank
In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act served as the foundational legislation for
the introduction of macroprudential policies as a regulatory tool. The Dodd-Frank Act
created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) with the mandate to design and
implement macroprudential regulation in the United States. 115 According to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Dodd-Frank Act "created FSOC to identify
and address threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system and the Office of Financial
Research (OFR) to support FSOC and Congress by providing financial research and
data."1 16 The FSOC has 14 members, five of whom are nonvoting. 117 The Secretary of the
Treasury chairs the Council. 118 The voting members include the chairs of the SEC, CFTC,
the Fed and FDIC, as well as the directors of Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and CFPB. 119 FSOC's aim is to unite all agencies, whose previous
regulatory mandate was microprudential, with the goal of assisting in the Dodd-Frank
Act's macroprudential regulatory mandates.
The Dodd-Frank Act also required that the FSOC regulate large Bank Holding
Companies (BHC) and SIFIs. 120 BHCs are defined as banks with a total asset base of $50
billion or more, arguably enshrining the concept of TBTF. 121 Section 165 of the Dodd-
Frank Act provides sweeping powers for the Federal Reserve to impose prudential
standards on systemic financial entities. Specifically, Section 165(d) required financial
entities with various sized holdings to file their resolution plans with the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB) and the FDIC by December 31, 2013.122 These so-called "living will"
the so-called bank-stress tests and acting as 'lender of last resort').
114. Id.at58.
115. Robert F. Weber, Structural Regulation as Antidote to Complexity Capture, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 643, 662
(2012).
116. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-12-886, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, NEW COUNCIL AND RESEARCH OFFICE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY OF THEIR DECISIONS 1 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648064.pdf
[hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS].




120. Id. at 3.
121. Id. at92.
122. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323, 67,323-30 (Nov. 1, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
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provisions aim to mitigate this permanent enshrinement of large banks and require that
BHCs provide a document to their regulators that sets forth the specific design and manner
by which they can be liquidated should the need arise. 123 The theory behind the living wills
is that if any SIFIs are in such trouble that they may require another bailout, an orderly
demise will be a more prudent option. 124 Additionally, such a scenario presents the
opportunity to demonstrate to these institutions that the United States is committed to
ending TBTF. 125 In fact, a possible end to TBTF continues to be cited as the primary
objective of the resolution authority under the Dodd-Frank. 126 Of course, the problem with
living wills is the potential lack of political willingness on the part of regulators to execute
the directives of the will when most needed. 127 Nevertheless, Professor Joseph Karl Grant
notes that these provisions are "the most sweeping piece of financial legislation and
regulation since the Great Depression, the FRB, and FDIC resolution planning rules will
have an enormous regulatory impact on financial institutions for years to come." 128 This
forecasted impact is a consequence of macroprudential policy implementation, and the
dampening of the risk appetite of SIFIs-lest they cease to exist.
The Dodd-Frank Act also devises a permanent stress test requirement similar to the
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)-the U.S. government's stress tests in
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis for all BHCs. 129 These tests are recognized as an
important macroprudential tool that will provide regulators with significant and detailed
information about the financial health of the individual institutions under their regulatory
pt. 243).
123. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5365.
124. See generally Stacie E. McGinn, Industrial Organization and Systemic Risk: An Agenda for Future
Research, in BANKING LAW INSTITUTE 2011: THE TRANSFORMATION CONTINUES 351 (Lee A. Meyerson &
William J. Sweet, Jr. eds. 2011) (presenting the scenario detailing how large financial institutions should go
through the liquidation process).
125. See generally Ann Graham, Bringing to Heel the Elephants in the Economy: The Case for Ending "Too
Big To Fail", 8 PIERCE L. REV. 117 (2010) (generally demonstrating that an orderly demise scenario would be
the opportune time to demonstrate that the government is committed to ending TBTF).
126. Joe Adler, Four Reasons You Should Care about Big Bank Wind-Down Plans, AM. BANKER (June 20,
2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_ 119/four-reasons-you-should-care-about-big-bank-wind-
down-plans-1068216-1 .html.
127. See generally Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011) (generally identifying
the lack of political willingness as a threat to the functionality of living wills).
128. Joseph Karl Grant, Planning for the Death of a Systematically Important Financial Institution Under
Title I § 165(D) of the Dodd-Frank Act: The Practical Implications of Resolution Plans or Living Wills in
Planning a Bank's Funeral, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 467, 469 (2012).
129. Acharya, supra note 97, at 18-19. The initial test results released by the Fed on March 15, 2013,
indicated that all BHCs in the United States have fully recovered and are maintaining Tier I capital at well-above
Basel II requirements. A thorough evaluation of these numbers may bring to light elements that would benefit
from further examination. The latest stress test results published in March 2014 indicated that all banks, except
one-Zions Bank-have passed the tests. Halah Touryalai, Stress Test Results: Big Banks Look Healthier as 29
of 30 Pass, Zions Fails, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2014, 4:32 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2014/03/20/stress-test-results-big-banks-look-healthier-as-29-of-30-
pass-zion-fails/. These tests and their criteria have been criticized in the past.
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supervision. 130 Furthermore, they illuminate potentially rising systemic risks. 131
The tip of the spear of macroprudential regulation in the Dodd-Frank Act is the
creation of the OFR within FSOC. 13 2 The OFR is tasked with "serving" FSOC as well as
its member agencies, "by improving the quality, transparency, and accessibility of financial
data and information, conducting and sponsoring research related to financial stability, and
promoting best practices in risk management." 13 3 This mandate requires OFR to establish
a data and research center to collect and standardize data, develop tools for risk
management, and perform long-term research. 134
Another macroprudential tool that the Dodd-Frank Act created is its directive for
enhanced oversight of credit rating agencies. 135 The SEC possesses this oversight
authority, and the Commission has proposed rules to augment its existing oversight and
complement the steps it followed after the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006.136
Section 932 of the Dodd-Frank Act allows for new requirements for these NRSROs, such
as conflict of interest reporting and examination that aim to prevent a close relationship
between the rating agency and the issuer of any rated product. 13 7 Under the Dodd-Frank
Act, each NRSRO is required to implement effective internal controls, and submit annual
reports to the SEC. 138
It is this combination of ongoing stress tests, living wills, FSOC, OFR and NRSRO
oversight that gives macroprudential regulation the highest chance of preventing-or
dampening-the impacts of systemic shocks, among available regulatory, and policy
tools. 13 9 First, at present, no other theories have been put forth that claim the potential to
mitigate a systemic crisis or manage the procyclical behavior of financial services firms.
Second, microprudential regulation alone has been demonstratively deficient in managing
large-scale crises. Third, macroprudential regulation is a complementary policy and
regulatory tool to microprudential regulation, and, as such, will serve to enhance current
regimes. 140
130. Andru E. Wall, Stress Tests & Market Discipline, 30 No. 10 BANKING & FIN. SERvS. POL'Y REP. 1, 1
(2011).
131. Id.
132. See generally OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 1
(2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Documents/OFRAnnuaLReport_071912_
Final.pdf [hereinafter 2012 ANNUAL REPORT] (noting the creation of the Office of Financial Research within
FSOC).
133. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 116, at 6.
134. Id.
135. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5365.
136. Credit Rating Agencies, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-
frank/creditratingagencies.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
137. Dodd-Frank Act § 932(a)(2)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 78a(15)(E)(c)(3).
138. SEC Release No. 34-64514; File No. S7-18-11 (May 18, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-64514.pdf.
139. See generally 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 132.
140. Hannoun, supra note 30, at 15-16.
[Vol. 40:2
The New Global Financial Regulatory Order
IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATORY
SCHEMES
Macroprudential regulation-properly designed and implemented--can act as both a
preventive measure and a containment mechanism for systemic shocks. Macroprudential
regulation's focus on endogenous risk and its design to collect system-wide information
delivered to a single regulatory entity that can act as either an exclusive macroprudential
regulator or more simply as an information aggregator tasked with spotting systemic risks,
provides a significant advantage unavailable to regulators and governments prior to
2008.141 This information aggregation is central to the task of a macroprudential regulator.
Systemic risks-as evidenced by decreased capital, liquidity, or increased leverage
ratios-can only be addressed on a large scale if the appropriate information has been
collected, dissected, and analyzed by a single regulatory body. 14 2 Ideally, the same body
will have the authority to enforce mandates to bring the system into balance by requiring
various entities--or the banking industry as a whole-to change their practices.
Nevertheless, a centralized repository and analytic body is a necessary first step. In
addition, harmonization on an international and domestic level is both a critical component
of macroprudential regulation and a potential threat to its existence.
A. Global Regulatory Harmonization: A Double Edged Sword
Macroprudential regulation-if and when implemented by the largest economies--
can be a significant incentive to bring various rogue financial jurisdictions, which until
now have tried to benefit from regulatory arbitrage, under the authority of the international
financial regulatory regimes of the Basel Accords and IOSCO. This presents a unique
opportunity for international financial regulation to succeed where it has previously
faltered. 143 This can even be seen in the flawed Basel II accord. As of May 2008, it was
estimated that by 2015, roughly 77% of the world's GDP, including countries such as India,
Egypt, and Pakistan, were planning to adopt and implement Basel II's guidelines. 144 By
2008, however, only 46% of the world's GDP had adopted Basel II, which could be one
measure of its ineffective control. 1 4 5 Perhaps this area of increased adoption presents an
opportunity for IOSCO to step in and enhance cooperation among its members, and thereby
help affect a deeper harmonization of macroprudential policy.
The greatest opportunity in the long-term implementation of macroprudential
141. See generally Amanda Risch, The Financial Stability Oversight Council, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L.
521 (2012) (discussing the Financial Stability Oversight Council); see generally Douglas W. Arner, et al., Central
Banks and Central Bank Cooperation in the Global Financial System, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV.
L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing central banks).
142. See generally Dimitrios Bisias et al., A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics (Office of Financial Research,
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Working Paper #0001 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
wsr/ofr/Documents/OFRwp0001 BisiasFloodLoValavanis.ASurveyOfSystemicRiskAnalytics.pdf (discussing
how regulatory agencies can utilize data from financial institutions to identify systemic risk threats).
143. See generally Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Amer, Toward a New Design for International Financial
Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 391 (2007) (discussing the history international financial regulatory institutions
and programs).
144. Balin, supra note 77, at 13.
145. Id.
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regulation is the reduction or elimination of the risk of systemic shocks that spread from
the financial sector to the economy at large. Specifically, macroprudential regulation-
correctly implemented domestically and coordinated globally-has the potential to
significantly reduce the risk of systemic shocks by providing governments and economies
with a sufficiently early warning that will enable preventive measures to be implemented,
or at least a containment system that will reduce the impact of any future shock. This early
warning system can be an essential component of a sound regulatory system without
market interference.
On the other hand, macroprudential regulation's success, in large part, is contingent
upon harmonized global standards because of the interconnection between large economies
and their markets, as well as the global footprint of the largest-and systemically most
important-entities that will be subject to macroprudential regulation. In essence, no single
nation can successfully implement macroprudential regulation alone in today's world.
Some argue that the concept of a globalized and interconnected world is not new, and if
measured by capital mobility, the world was just as globalized in 1914 as it was in 2000.146
However, assuming that the depth and breadth of past globalization is equal in various
measures to today, our world is different by one measure: speed of capital mobility.
Moving capital from one financial center to another historically involved more time and
effort than it does today. This speed is facilitated by two important factors. The first is the
spread of technology as an enabler of banking transactions around the world. The second
factor is the rise of a global corporatocracy that aims to penetrate all available markets for
its products. Such penetration has naturally smoothed the cultural differences in
international trade. Speed and mobility of capital present compelling reasons as to why
macroprudential regulation is needed, yet can only function if different domestic regulators
cooperate on a scale heretofore unseen. Unfortunately, such integrated cooperation has not
been observed, and may also lead to problems inherent in harmonization, as discussed
below.
A potential weakness inherent in any new regulatory endeavor that is amplified by
harmonization is the uncertainty in the predictive ability of regulation. The poor
performance of Basel I and II underscore the tenuous predictive ability of policy and
regulation. This may be partly due to the use of causation as a regulatory analytical tool.
One premise of all post-hoc regulation in the United States has been the remediation of the
underlying causes of previous crises. The history of regulation from the 1933 Securities
Act to Basel II demonstrates that post hoc regulation, while capable of addressing the issues
of a previous crisis, is very poor at predicting and mitigating future crises. 147
The primary obstacle in harmonization is that in a future crisis, any inherent regulatory
flaw has, by the time of the crisis, automatically spread far and wide at a much more rapid
146. See Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, Globalization and Capital Markets 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8846, 2003), available at www.nber.org/papers/w8846.pdf (noting that while
"globalization" is a relatively new term, global integration in capital mobility has only recently returned to levels
seen in 1914).
147. See Anthony Browne, Here's a Radical Idea: Let's Take Stock Before Introducing More Regulation,
CITY AM (Oct. 4, 2012, 12:39 AM), http://www.cityam.com/articlelhere-s-radical-idea-let-s-take-stock-
introducing-more-regulation (explaining the overregulation problem and suggesting a slower implementation
process).
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pace than before. Systemic crises are damaging in different ways to different systems. 148
The 2008 financial crisis devastated many countries around the world, but it did so in
divergent ways. 149 In a harmonized global financial regulatory system, the risk is that all
member states of that system will experience the same damage on a depth not previously
experienced. 150
These reasons foretell why harmonization will be difficult, when considering that
various governments have taken different approaches to the concept of macroprudential
regulation's implementation. 151 Even if the United States, United Kingdom 15 2 and
European Union 15 3 manage to successfully harmonize, China may remain marginalized,
especially since its state-driven, centrally-planned economy can quickly implement
macroprudential regulation without external cooperation. Furthermore, commoditization
of risk transference is both a weakness of macroprudential regulation and a threat. If all
agencies cooperate globally, then the risk of contagion is both instant and global. Risk is
productized by the virtue of harmonization of regulatory systems required to meet
macroprudential regulation mandates. The likely best path to a successful implementation
of macroprudential policies is deep regulatory harmonization among the G20. At the
macroprudential level, as posited by Basel III, such harmonization, by its very nature,
leaves close to 90% of the world's GDP' 54 susceptible to the same "unknown unknown"
systemic risks that no one can fathom today. In such a case, if the threat is not manageable
by macroprudential-or other-policies, then harmonization will only lead to faster,
deeper, harder, and longer economic crises. 155
148. See generally Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial Crises (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14656, 2009), available at http://web.calstatela.edu/faculty/
rcastil/Econ462/Crises.pdf (comparing the buildup and aftermath of banking crises in various economies).
149. See generally Anna Gelpem, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009) (examining
financial crisis containment).
150. See generally Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial
Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 243 (2010) (examining the effectiveness
of international organizations in responding to financial crises).
151. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARv. INT'L L.J. 55, 62-
63 (2011) (explaining the different financial systems used by various states).
152. See generally Paula Moffatt & Andrew Campbell, Emerging Changes to the United Kingdom's
Financial-Sector Safety Net Following the Banking Crisis of 2007-2008,30 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP.
10 (2011) (describing the current evolution of the U.K.'s financial sector regulations); see also Central Banking:
The England Job, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 1, 2012), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21561889
(discussing the candidates for governor of the Bank of England).
153. Some scholars, like Nicolas Veron, have argued for deeper integration in the European Union. Veron
compares the U.S. and E.U. experience in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis and arrives at the
conclusion that the federal legislative system in the U.S. enabled the country to adopt better regulations at a faster
pace. This allowed the U.S. to exit the crisis more successfully than its Atlantic neighbors. Challenges ofEurope's
Fourfold Union: Hearing on "The Future of the Eurozone: Outlook and Lessons" Before the Subcomm. on
European Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (statement of Nicolas Veron,
Visiting Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics), available at
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/VeronTestimony.pdf.
154. The G20 economies made up 85% of global GDP in 2014. G20, POLICY NOTE: GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT 1 (Nov. 2014), available at https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/policy-note-growth-
and-development I .pdf.
155. See Hyun Song Shin, Macroprudential Policies Beyond Basel I11, Keynote Speech Before the Joint
Conference of the Bank for International Settlements and the Bank of Korea: Macroprudential Policies Beyond
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One particular threat to the success of macroprudential regulation is the rapid global
growth of shadow banking. According to Pozsar et al., "Shadow banks are financial
intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without explicit
access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees." 156 These banking
activities, which include "credit, maturity and liquidity transformation," lack the support
of a central bank that can act as a backstop. 157 At the height of the previous boom in the
financial services industry, around 2007, the difference between bank and shadow
liabilities was estimated at approximately eight trillion dollars. 158 Yet, regulation of
shadow banking has been fraught with difficulty. 159 The same parties who have challenged
other aspects of macroprudential regulation have also opposed regulation of shadow
banking, citing a potential reduction of economic growth as a negative factor. 160 Another
possible risk is that the United States may not prove willing to cooperate on an international
level and refuse or fail to implement macroprudential regulation on a truly harmonized
international landscape that may compromise American traditions. There is the risk that
the United States rigidly insists on being a shining city on the hill and merely invites all
others to climb that hill.
B. Domestic Regulatory Coordination & Cooperation
The dual issues of regulatory fragmentation and discretion pose a significant
hindrance to the harmonized view of macroprudential policy. One weakness inherent in the
effective implementation of macroprudential regulation on an international level is the
requirement of a tectonic shift in the belief system of domestic regulatory regimes. In the
move from micro to macroprudential regulation, disclosure must take into account the links
between products, institutions, and transactions that have been regulated by different
agencies, subject to different rules, promulgated under different legislation, and adopted
under an often-varied, socio-economic environment. Therefore, the regulated entities must
provide far more information about their institutions and affairs than ever before. 
16 1
This leads directly to another inherent weakness of a coordinated regulatory system,
where such regimes exercise their discretion, which often fails to be in the best interests of
markets or investors. Regulators, faced with limited resources, must choose where, how,
Basel III (Jan. 17, 2011), in BIS PAPERS No. 60, Dec. 2011, at 5, available at http://www.bis.org/publ
bppdf/bispap60.pdf (examining the risk associated with the interconnectedness of international banks).
156. Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, 2013 FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 1 (2013).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 6.
159. See Thorvald Grung-Moe, Shadow Banking: Policy Challenges for Central Banks 20 (Levy Economics
Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 802, May 2014), available at
http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/shadow-banking-policy-challenges-for-central-banks (discussing the
problems with regulation of shadow banking).
160. See Paul Kupiec, The Economic Costs of Imposing Bank Regulations on "Shadow Banking, " AM.
ENTER. INST. (May 5, 2014), http://www.aei.org/article/economics/financial-services/banking/the-economic-
costs-of-imposing-bank-regulations-on-shadow-banking/ (discussing the problems with attempting to regulate
shadow banking).
161. See NICOLAS GRABAR & ETHIOPIS TAFARA, GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS
2010: STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 632-37 (PLI/Corp. 2010) (reporting SEC
changes in regulations requiring increased disclosure).
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and when to make their mark. This resource allocation naturally leads to choices that may
be the least efficient means of exercising jurisdiction. This has been a significant problem
heretofore. In the case of macroprudential regulation, poor exercise of regulatory discretion
would render the concept moot, Macroprudential regulation requires its primary regulator
to collect vast amounts of data and develop risk models based on the current state of the
industry at large. 162 As such, macroprudential regulation will suffer a fatal blow if the
regulators choose to collect the incorrect data at the wrong intervals or simply to choose
not to collect certain data. Furthermore, this vast effort will certainly face significant
opposition from industry. To be fair, the entirety of the U.S. regulatory system was
"fragmented" prior to the crisis, and did not focus on systemic risk to a sufficient degree.
163
The fact that systemic risk regulation requires cooperation on the part of disparate
regulators with differing mandates rendered such regulation a postscript to the prudential
regulatory efforts of the Fed. 164
A potential pitfall of attempting to coordinate a fragmented domestic regulatory
system is failing to exert influence over the strength of the correlation between
securities/commodities regulation and systemic risk. Essentially, why should the SEC or
the CFTC include macroprudential mandates in their already overburdened regulatory
infrastructure? The primary arguments against such mandates focus on the core mission of
each agency and their continued work to protect investors, and ensure market efficiency
and capital flow. However, these arguments are merely thinly veiled efforts to maintain the
trajectory of regulatory fragmentation that has existed in the United States. This
fragmentation has created various turfs that need fences to protect them and to keep out
intruders. Systemic risk is-and will remain-arguably the foundation of all three
mandates of securities regulators. Specifically, the largest failure in the investor protection
arena would be a systemic failure of large banks, leading to a severe market collapse. 16 5
Such an event would also have a significantly negative impact on market efficiency and
capital flow.
The problem of coordinating differing regulatory regimes, both domestic and
international, presented itself in January 2013, when BCBS further delayed implementation
of its capital requirement rules, essentially acknowledging that the stricter definitions and
capital requirements may lead to another economic downturn. 166 This acknowledgment
highlights a significant challenge in the implementation of tighter banking rules after three
decades of global deregulation. However, not everyone is convinced of the sufficiency of
Basel III's capital requirement rules.
In a scathing article, Thomas Hoenig, Vice Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
162. See Models and Tools for Macroprudential Analysis 9 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
Working Paper No. 21, Bank for International Settlements, 2012) (analyzing how "[c]entral banks and supervisors
typically use a suite of models and tools ... to conduct macro stress testing").
163. Annette L. Nazareth, Reflections on Systemic Risk Regulation in Response to Karmel's Paper, 35
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 845, 847 (2010).
164. Id.
165. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and
Complex Finance, 31 REv. BANKING & FtN. L. 765, 765 (2012) (analyzing whether big banks actually generate
greater risks to financial stability than do other institutions).
166. Jack Ewing, Banks Win an Easing of Rules on Assets, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/01/07/business/global/07iht-banks07.html?partner=rss&emc=rss.
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Corporation, criticizes Basel III as a "continuation" of a "poor record" of a "fundamentally
flawed" regulatory system. 167 He goes on to suggest, "to be useful, a capital rule must be
simple, understandable and enforceable." 16 8 The argument Hoenig puts forth, repeated by
others, is that the Basel framework has become too complex. Complexity presents two
important problems for an international body, seeking adherence to its standards. 169 First,
the more complex the system, the more room for regulatory arbitrage among member
states. 170 The Basel Accords frame broad mandates and leave the specific rulemaking to
the discretion of domestic regulators. 171 Therefore, each signatory may interpret these
mandates in a light most favorable to its domestic banking institutions, in an effort to
provide these banks with a competitive global advantage in attracting foreign capital.
Second, the higher the level of complexity, the less likely it is to be uniformly enforced-
even among member states that wish to fully enforce the rules. 172 Such lack of uniformity
will, in turn, undermine one of the main purposes of the Basel Accords: harmonization of
international banking rules, leading to better management of individual institutions with a
global presence that pose a systemic risk to the global economies and their markets. 173
C. Evolving View of Risk
A macroprudential regulator tells banks and financial institutions what they must and
must not do. 174 Therefore, this "ideational shift" raises an important concern about how
macroprudential regulation might be situated within the economy-at-large and the financial
services regulatory framework in particular. 175 Theoretically, macroprudential regulation
aims to produce foundational support for the economy by mandating capital buffers that
change with the specific institutional risk profile taken in the context of the macroeconomic
view of risk. 176 Therefore, micro and macroprudential regulation should complement each
167. Thomas Hoenig, A Better Alternative to Basel Capital Rules, HARV. L. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FiN. REG. (Sept. 28, 2012, 8:58 am), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/09/28/a-better-altemative-to-
basel-capital-rules/#more-33274.
168. Id.
169. See Donna Borak, A Bold Plan to Eliminate 'Complexity Risk', 176 AM. BANKER 1, 3 (Nov. 21, 2011)
(quoting a managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, Inc., who asserts that, "the underlying problem is
complexity risk, which... may well be 'the most significant impediment to financial market recovery and robust
economic growth').
170. Id.
171. Rudin, supra note 83, at 627.
172. See Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779, 797- h801
(2011) (describing how financial market complexity discourages participants from fully examining or
understanding the risk in their actions).
173. See generally Adeline Saillard, The Role of Complementarity and the Financial Liberalization in the
Financial Crisis (Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Working Paper, 2012.38, 2012),
available at ftp://mse.univ-parisl.fr/pub/mse/CES2012/12038.pdf (using modeling to predict the effects of
structure and liberalization on the likelihood of a major crisis).
174. Andrew Baker, The New Political Economy of the Macroprudential Ideational Shift, 18 NEW POL.
ECON. 112 (2013).
175. See id. at 113 (exploring the shift of macroprudential regulation to become an important interpretative
framework).
176. See Avinash Persaud, Macro-Prudential Regulation, 6 CRISiS RESPONSE I, 3-4 (2009) (describing the
usefulness of capital buffers).
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other by providing a comprehensive view of both institutional and industry-wide risk. This
would not only provide for a shift in prudential regulation, from institutional management
to systemic early warning, but also requires that both regulatory systems work in tandem
for prudential regulation to succeed. In short, a macroprudential regulatory system is
partially dependent on the success of a modified institutional microprudential system that
continues to track institutional risk, and gather and disseminate information. One can see
the balance between macro and microprudential policies by examining how each system
views risk. A microprudential regulatory system focuses on exogenous risk by evaluating
institutional risk through transactional disclosure. 177 Macroprudential regulation focuses
on endogenous risk by concentrating on liquidity, cyclical forces and capital adequacy
within the scope of a sector. 178
These two regulatory frameworks have complementary risk mitigation objectives. It
is arguable that a microprudential regulator with existing oversight authority can most
efficiently collect the information required to help assess systemic risk by a
macroprudential regulator. 179 The difficulty in implementing macroprudential regulation
will arrive with the authority and jurisdiction of the regulator tasked with designing and
enforcing that regime. A macroprudential regulator whose only authority is to collect and
analyze information lacks the necessary mandate to dictate the steps essential to enforcing
countercyclical measures, and may therefore be ultimately unsuccessful.
D. The Future of Macroprudential Regulation in the United States
One of the primary threats to macroprudential regulatory success comes from the
strength of the current financial regulatory system in the United States, which may prove
to be a hindrance to macroprudential regulatory efforts. The critical metric in this issue is
whether-and by how much-the current system will bend to accommodate
macroprudential regulation.
Annette Nazareth-a former Director of the Division of Trading and Markets at the
SEC-argues that a systemic risk regulator without the requisite enforcement authority will
not be able to perform its duties. 180 She states,
whether the Federal Reserve adds a systemic risk function to its current
supervisory and regulatory responsibilities, or a council of regulators aggregates
their collective information and experience to serve the systemic risk role,
ultimately, functional regulators must play a key role in an effective systemic
risk regulatory regime. A systemic risk regulator that has no supervisory and
regulatory role could theoretically rely on data provided by the functional
regulators, but the information would be derivative and may lag real-time events
177. Id. at 2.
178. See Viral V. Acharya, Professor of Economics at NYU-Stem, Presentation at OFR: Contingent
Liquidity Risks (December 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/OFR-
Archarya.pdf (presenting information and examples on the dangers of contingent liquidity risks).
179. Nikola Spatafora, Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring
Systemic Risks, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 2009: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 319, 420-21 (Practicing
Law Institute, 2009).
180. Nazareth, supra note 163, at 845.
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due to coordination issues. This could be problematic, particularly in times of
crisis. Given that the U.S. regulatory framework will likely remain fragmented
after the anticipated legislative reforms to financial regulation, a council of
regulators would be conducive to the information aggregation process, whether
as an advisory body to a systemic risk regulator or as a body with systemic risk
authority itself. 181
Such lack of supervisory roles may, in turn, lead to turf fights, both domestic and
international, and prove to be a significant challenge in the rush to build a macroprudential
regulatory system. It may create short-term turf wars among various domestic regulators
in the United States. 182 Of course, the important question is: how is the information
processed, analyzed, and updated upon disclosure? Even if the disclosures are accurate,
timely, and provided in a cooperative manner, the task of distilling this vast reservoir of
information into a pool of knowledge that can produce a pearl of wisdom may prove
difficult to implement. In the end, the question is: who, or what, shall serve as the oracle
that will sit atop the newly created Delphi and impart wisdom? The United States' answer
has been the creation of the FSOC. 183 FSOC's membership contains all the primary
financial regulators in the United States. However, the synchronization and information
transfer necessary between FSOC and its member regulatory agencies may prove difficult
to implement. 184
Indeed, FSOC has experienced growing pains and attacks from all directions. First, it
has come under fire from other regulatory agencies that deemed its activities to fall under
their jurisdiction. 185 In fact, in early 2014, the SEC opposed efforts on the part of FSOC
to regulate certain firms in the asset management industry, deemed to be systemically
important enough to fall under the mandate of FSOC. 186 Second, it has come under fire
from Congress for overreach and cooperation with the FSB. 187 Third, it has experienced
significant opposition from industry for various attempts at SIFI designation. 188
In this process, some have even questioned the agency's authority to enforce its
mandate. At the same time, others have come to defend the young agency by pointing out
that FSOC needs to be strengthened, not weakened, in order to be able to fulfill the promise
181. Id. at 846-47.
182. Gina Chon, SEC Commissioner Calls on US Regulators to End Turf Wars, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/int/cms/s/0/97ffacce-f251-11 e3-ac7a-00144feabdcO.html.
183. Risch, supra note 141, at 523.
184. See id. at 529 (discussing structural issues of the FSOC).
185. Ryan Tracy, Regulators Promise Changes for Applying 'Systemic' Label, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-promise-changes-for-applying-systemic-label-
1421876026?autologin=y.
186. Andrew Ackerman & Ryan Tracy, SEC Fights Turf War Over Asset Managers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28,
2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702303277704579349162124450516.
187. Denny Gulino, Enemies of US FSOC See Too Much Cooperation with G20's FSB, MNI (May 20,2014),
https://mninews.marketnews.com/index.php/enemies-us-fsoc-see-too-much-cooperation-g2Os-fsb?q=
content/enemies-us-fsoc-see-too-much-cooperation-g20s-fsb.
188. Peter J. Wallison, The Authority of the FSOC and the FSB to Designate SIFIs: Implications for the
Regulation of Insurers in the United States after the Prudential Decision 3-4 (Networks Financial Institute at
Indiana State University, Paper No. 2014-PB-02, 2014), available at http://indstate.eduibusiness/NFI/
leadership/briefs/2014-PB-02_Wallison.pdf.
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of foreseeing future crises and mitigating systemic risk. 189 FSOC's attempts to regulate
the financial industry or designate SIFIs will continue to be fiercely opposed, given that it
is the primary macroprudential regulator in the United States. In attempting to use various
macroprudential regulatory tools, FSOC has become the disruptive force within both the
financial services industry and the regulatory infrastructure of the United States. However,
the coordination required to implement FSOC's mandates among various domestic
regulators will lead to more effective and uniform implementation of regulatory oversight,
especially for SIFIs. Presently, the regulatory system in the United States is fragmented
along products and transactions, so a single institution's different activities fall under the
jurisdiction of separate agencies. This organizational structure may have been effective at
a time when banking, securities, and derivatives trading were conducted in distinct,
unrelated entities; in a world of SIFIs, however, macroprudential regulation can bring all
the information from different agencies under one umbrella and create a far more
comprehensive and cohesive view of the markets and their participants. 190 One must not
underestimate, however, the political and regulatory clout that SIFIs possess, which is a
power they will utilize to maintain the status quo in a fragmented system. 19 1 In the process
of various agencies promulgating rules under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SIFIs have proven
to be a formidable voice in relaxing the mandates, if they believe that macroprudential
regulation will hurt their short- or long-term profitability. 192
Another existential threat to macroprudential regulation's success in the United States
is that implementation of macroprudential mandates is years away, and in the meantime
risk could continue to build in the system. 193 The Dodd-Frank Act's rulemaking process
has been slow and painful. Even FSOC and OFR have not been able to implement their
mandates rapidly. Regulatory critics have heralded this slow progress as further evidence
that the Dodd-Frank Act is too burdensome. 194 On the other hand, supporters of further
regulation lament the prospect of watered down rules in the face of industry pressure. Both
189. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL STABILITY, CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED
TO STRENGTHEN NEW COUNCIL AND RESEARCH OFFICE 4 (Mar. 14, 2013), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653013 .pdf.
190. See Hilary J. Allen, Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 125, 137 (2012)
(encouraging the use of common equity instead of cocos). See generally Alireza M. Gharagozlou, Unregulable:
Why Derivatives May Never Be Regulated, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 269 (2010) (exploring various
methods of regulating financial derivative contracts); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities
as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011) (describing how a bankrupt's derivative
counterparty receives unfair advantages from being able to collect from bankrupt party first).
191. See Jack Ewing, Banks Win an Easing of Rules on Assets, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/business/global/07iht-banks07.html?partner-rss&emc=rss (describing how
regulators are giving banks more time to comply with rules).
192. See Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: Strengths,
Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 193 (2012) (examining
the strengths and limitation of the Dodd-Frank Act, which gives regulators great latitude to narrow or expand
"proscriptive nature" of the amendments).
193. See Paul Saltzman et al., A Spirited Conversation Assessing the Risks and Benefits of Big Banks, 16
N.C. BANKING INST. 1 (2012) (discussing the benefits and risks of big banks).
194. See generally Robert Bostrom et al., Reconciling the Dodd Frank And Basel Committee Capital
Requirements, 129 BANKING L. J. 627 (2012) (analyzing the new risk-based capital requirements imposed under
the Dodd-Frank Act).
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sides observe that the implementation of macroprudential regulatory mandates is years
away, for better or worse.
One tool of a macroprudential regulatory scheme, however, has already been put in
place in the United States-stress tests of banks. The Obama administration's definition of
"too big to fail" adopted this concept, beyond the bounds of sheer size to include
interconnectedness as a criterion for Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies (FHC). 195 Yet,
in an environment of TBTF, an opposite sentiment began to brew in the public: let it fail. 
19 6
Macroprudential regulation also affords the fitting course for the supervision of the "Thank
God It Failed" institution. 197 The living will provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act provide
for an orderly winding down of institutions that may prove to exert undue pressure on the
financial sector, and their risk profile may warrant liquidation. 198 This is a significant
opportunity to contain risk that could become systemic in nature. 1
99
An argument can be made that the stress tests lead to the institutionalization of "too
big to fail." Stress testing financial institutions is an important macroprudential regulatory
tool.200 It provides regulators with a deeper and broader view of the future health of a
financial services entity under differing scenarios. However, there are several pragmatic
problems with stress testing. 20 1 First, the various capital adequacy and liquidity ratio
scenarios that were used in the initial round of stress tests were criticized as being too
195. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 10 (2009),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport-web.pdf [hereinafter FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION] ("We propose the creation of a Financial Services Oversight
Council to facilitate information sharing and coordination, identify emerging risks, advise the Federal Reserve on
the identification of firms whose failure could pose a threat to financial stability due to their combination of size,
leverage, and interconnectedness (hereafter referred to as a Tier I FHC), and provide a forum for resolving
jurisdictional disputes between regulators."); Part 225-Bank of Holding Companies and Change in Bank
Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (2014), available at http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=a9ca2c8a3fdbcO79b
3 f795dc4d98f5 f3&node= 12:3.0.1.1.6.9&rgn=div6 (Tier 1 Financial Holding Company designation is intended to
be a broader designation than a Bank Holding Company, and targets a financial services entity that is engaged in
banking, securities trading, insurance or other financial services activities, and the Federal Reserve Board
determines that "material financial distress" at the designated entity "could pose a threat to global or United States
financial stability." The designation of these entities is at the discretion of the Fed, and takes into account assets
under management and revenue, and the Fed will impose risk-based capital requirements, leverage limits,
liquidity requirements and other risk management requirements.).
196. See Cheryl D. Block, A Continuum Approach to Systemic Risk and Too-Big-To-Fail, 6 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 289, 293 (2012) (discussing public outrage over too-big-to-fail banks).
197. Id.
198. See Joseph Karl Grant, Planning for the Death of a Systematically Important Financial Institution
Under Title I§ 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act: The Practical Implications of Resolution Plans or Living Wills in
Planning a Bank's Funeral, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REv. 467, 469-70 (2012) (postulating that "the FRB and FDIC
resolution planning rules will have an enormous impact on financial institutions for years to come.").
199. See Paul A. Volcker & Jacob A. Frenkel, Enhancing Financial Stability and Resilience,
Macroprudential Policy, Tools, and Systems for the Future, GROUP OF THIRTY 14, (Oct., 2010), available at
http://hb.betterregulation.com/extemal/Enhancing /20financial /20stability%/2Oand /20resilience /20macropru
dential%20policy,%20tools%20and%20systems%20for/o20the%20future.pdf ("macroprudential policy aims to
enhance the resilience of the financial system and to dampen systemic risks that spread through the financial
system ... ").
200. Wall, supra note 130.
201. Claudio Borio et al., Stress- Testing Macro Stress Testing: Does it Live Up to Expectations? 1-12 (Bank
for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 329, 2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/work369.pdf.
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lenient and thus able to produce a false positive. 20 2 Second, the macroeconomic indicator
assumptions about the scenarios that these entities may face were also criticized as too
optimistic, further exacerbating the problem of test validity. 20 3 Third, choosing which
institutions need to be tested is a tacit admission of their importance to the macroeconomic
health of the country, and, as such, enshrines their status as "too big to fail."
20 4
The stress testing process has also proven difficult to implement. Delays, false starts,
and complaints about costs plague the process. 205 Furthermore, with some banks failing
the tests from time-to-time, there has grown a cottage industry of analysts who purport to
foretell the simultaneous dangers of both the tests and the banks that fail them. 206 Amidst
this experimental and rapidly evolving regulatory landscape, the Fed has proposed minor
changes to the stress tests, in order to both strengthen their impact and ease the regulatory
burden on the banks. 
207
The question that remains, therefore, is twofold. First, will permanent stress testing
continue to produce overly positive results, rendering the exercise moot? Second, will
permanent stress tests lead to the permanent existence of "too big to fail"? If the answer to
both questions is yes, then macroprudential regulation will also fail because stress tests will
fail to reveal financial problems at SIFIs, and they will continue to accumulate unnecessary
risk based on the assumption that they will, in the end, be rescued by the taxpayers of one
government or another.
In spite of both existing and potential weaknesses, macroprudential regulation
provides the best path to the management of "too big to fail" institutions. Properly designed
and executed stress tests combined with the resolve to exercise the living will provisions
of the Dodd-Frank Act will lead to two desirable outcomes. First, SIFIs will tend to
accumulate less risk in order to show a positive outcome in their stress tests. Second, SIFIs
will shy away from their riskiest activities because SIFIs are aware of the fact that they
may be liquidated and unwound instead of receiving another injection of capital by the
U.S. government.
20 8
202. Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99 GEO. L.J. 1615,
1615 (2011).
203. Id. at 1647.
204. Id. at 1660.
205. Trefis Team, Fed Stress Test For Banks: Rationale, Results & Implications, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/20 14/03/24/fed-stress-test-for-banks-rationale-results-
implications/.
206. Michael J. Moore & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Citigroup Fails Fed Stress Test as BofA Gets Dividend
Boost, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-26/citigroup-fails-fed-stress-
test-as-goldman-bofa-modify-plans.html.
207. Alan Zibel, Fed Proposes Changes to Annual Stress Test, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/fed-proposes-changes-to-annual-stress-test- 1402600392?tesla=y&mg-reno64-
wsj&url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI 0001424052702303642704579620502625729172.html (One
interesting change has been pushing back the deadline from January 5th to April 5th, acknowledging the
complaints of bankers who spent their 2013 holidays working to produce the test results.).
208. See Viral V. Acharya, Governments as Shadow Banks: The Looming Threat to Financial Stability, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1765 (2012) (discussing the outcomes of risky investment behavior in the financial market,
even when government regulations gauge such behavior in providing capital).
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E. Technology and Information Asymmetry
Another possible hurdle for macroprudential regulation is that it will attempt to
mitigate systemic risk in an environment where the system itself is undergoing a rapid
technological change, the consequences of which may not be easily ascertainable or
manageable by regulators at first glance.209 One threshold issue is the development and
maintenance of a proper understanding of the underlying system. In the case of the financial
services industry, the system is globally interconnected; therefore, any macroprudential
regulation requires coordination on an international level. While this international
harmonization may seem beneficial, it also poses certain challenges. 2
10
Moreover, there is a structural hindrance to the inherently top-down approach of
macroprudential regulation, which lies in the trifold view of the information collected by
regulating entities like the OFR. 2 1 1 These problems are the quality, quantity, and reliability
of the information available and collected by any macroprudential regulator. The quality
of the information concerns whether a financial institution and/or its auditors have a high
level of confidence in the information produced to the regulator. In essence, do the banks
believe their own hype? The quantity of information presents the traditional signal-noise
challenge that many engineers face. A macroprudential regulator must collect, collate,
correlate, and comprehensibly organize volumes of data every day, before it can actually
form a coherent model that can produce the proverbial canary in the coalmine. The problem
here is that the volume of information produced by the financial services industry annually
is larger than the volume of all the mines on earth. So, how accurate will the models be?
Will these macroprudential regulatory models raise the alarm bells in a sufficiently early
time so regulators can act and prevent disaster? How can one organization detect the signal
from the tsunami of noise that it faces on a daily basis?
The problem of reliability is the sister to that of quality. Once it is determined that the
information is valid (high quality) and represents a signal (quantity), the regulator must
determine its reliability before taking action. Reliability is a problem that plagues every
human endeavor. This canyon is so deep that industries from automobiles to the Internet
have devised solutions to overcome unreliability by quantifying the problem. Yet, in the
field of financial services and economics, most data is viewed to be inherently unreliable.
Most economic prognosticators have a very low degree of confidence in their own models.
Therefore, how can a macroprudential regulator confidently march forward and act without
209. See 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 132, at 27 (discussing challenges to mitigating financial stability
which includes keeping up with technology); see also Nellie Liang, FSOC / OFR Conference: Discussion of "A
Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics" by Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis 5 (2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Docunents/OFR-Liang.pdf (discussing sources of systemic risks-
including innovations, financial conditions of financial institutions, and other structural and cyclical risks).
210. See generally Paul Fisher, Why Britain 's Banking Rules Aren 't Restricting Our Economic Recovery,
CITY AM (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.cityam.com/article/why-britain-s-banking-rules-aren-t-restricting-our-
economic-recovery (discussing the weaknesses of the British banking system, and the need to assess risks before
taking on relationships between banking institutions).
211. See REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 116, at 10 (discussing the challenges facing
the OFR as they attempt to establish a regulatory regime in both the short-term and long-term); see also
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 195, at 2-5 (discussing the U.S. Department
of the Treasury's approach to increasing its regulation of the financial system).
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a reasonable degree of certainty that its actions will counteract the procyclical effects of a
boom, and such actions will not simply throw the entire economy into a recession? In the
end, data correlation may produce prescient, but unreliable results overruled by human
intervention may lead to the same problem we experienced in the past: the ideas and
regulations are available, but the people refuse to act.
Nevertheless, in spite of all the risks and weaknesses, macroprudential policy presents
the best hope for preventing a repeat of the 2008 global financial crisis. Thus far, the United
States has been able to enact legislation necessary for the foundation of a macroprudential
system. What remains to be seen is whether the rest of the world will catch, surpass, or
remain behind the United States in regulatory efforts.
V. CONCLUSION
Macroprudential regulation differs from its microprudential counterpart in a
significant manner. The former's regulatory regimes and bodies, charged with limiting
systemic risk, create a top-down approach whereby they dictate the terms and conditions
of individual institutions' activities, where those activities impact systemic risk.2 12 In
essence, where a microprudential system is designed to collect information and relies on
the market to ferret out information asymmetries, the macroprudential regime's role is to
collect data (disclosures) and search for presumably scattered, anomalous behavior leading
to market inefficiencies or investor loss. However, even though macroprudential regulation
has a long academic history, as well as a large following in policy circles, it remains a novel
regulatory concept. As such, it may prove incompatible with the current regulatory mindset
in many of the countries where its implementation is crucial to the long-term success of
the concept. In fact, in the United States, in spite of the legislative efforts to incorporate
macroprudential regulation, it remains a mystery as to whether the regulators will be able
to implement their mandate. 
2 13
From a broader, macroeconomic perspective, the separation of investment banking
from depository banking is hailed as the savior of the financial industry-and cited as a
macroprudential policy-by pointing to the absence of financial crises from 1940 to
1970.214 However, it is worth noting that part of the absence of crises post-WWII was due
to rebuilding, which eliminated the problem of capital allocation. This is an economically
important point that gainers little attention. If efficient capital allocation is, in fact,
inherently impossible in large-scale economies with different participants and industries,
then macroprudential regulation may be doomed from the start. Starting in 1971, banking
212. See Yves Smith, Defining Strategies and Tools for Reducing Systemic Risk, NAKED CAPITALISM (Aug.
6, 2012), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/08/defining-strategies-and-tools-for-reducing-systemic-
risk.html (referencing Giovanni Favara & Lev Ratnovski, Macroprudential Policy: Economic Rationale and
Optimal Tools, Vox (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.voxeu.org/article/macroprudential-policy-economic-rationale-
and-optimal-tools (comparing the advantages of using macroprudential regulation over microprudential when
seeking to control systemic risk in the financial market)).
213. Davis Polk, Dodd-Frank Progress Report (2014), available at http://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-
Rulemaking-Progress-Report/.
214. Franklin Allen & Richard Herring, Banking Regulation Versus Securities Market Regulation, THE
WHARTON FIN. INSTS. CTR. (2001), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-allenf/download/
Vita/0129.pdf.
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liberalization led to market forces taking over from centralized allocation of capital, and
with this shift came more risk and volatility but also a sensational period of global growth
that has rarely been observed since the industrial revolution. 215 The question of efficient
capital allocation in a decentralized, capitalist economy is important to consider for
macroprudential regulators. Macroprudential regulation may prove to be the best option in
a deregulated and globalized market where there are no legal firewalls between various
banking activities and regulatory arbitrage provides a haven for those chasing ever
increasing risk for the mythically promised returns. The post-2008 answer to this problem
is adding countercyclical buffers, enhanced capital requirements and ongoing stress
tests. 2 16 Even with these measures, however, if decentralized market economies are
naturally prone to asset bubbles, then it would be difficult to discover, measure, and
successfully prevent a systemic shock prior to the bursting of such bubbles.
2 17
Macroprudential regulation's efforts at thwarting risk may reduce the growth curve as
well. 2 18 Capital is attracted by the potential for high returns, which are naturally associated
with high risk. If the risk is reduced or eliminated from the equation, it is possible that
capital allocation will become stagnant, leading to lower risk but lower growth as well.
This is one point that opponents of regulation are eager to single out, blaming the reduced
growth potential of the U.S. economy in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, in part
on regulatory overreach. 2 19 This line of attack fails to note two important points: first, the
economy's output potential was reduced as a direct result of the recession itself; second,
much of the macroprudential regulatory regime that Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act
envisioned have yet to be fully implemented, especially with regard to systemic risk
oversight. Increased costs to the system and the individual institutions under supervision
may create backlash and advocacy for more regulatory forbearance. Chairman Bernanke,
for example, warned about the high costs of a macroprudential regulatory system.
220
Nevertheless, as one of its primary promises, macroprudential regulation can act as a global
means to shine a permanent light on dark markets, and thus reduce their impact on the
financial system. 22 1 The issue is whether regulation, enacted in hindsight, can prevent a
future crisis whose causes are as yet to be determined.
215. Id.
216. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 60 (rev. 2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
217. See James A. Fanto, The Role of Financial Regulation in Private Financial Firms: Risk Management
and the Limitations of the Market Model, 3 BROOK. J. COR. FIN. & COM. L. 29, 40 (2008) ("It is likely that this
will become apparent too late to prevent significant damage to, and even failure of, the regulated firm.").
218. See No Need to Strengthen Macroprudential Steps for Now, KOREA TIMES (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2012/09/182_120580.html ("Korea's top central banker said Friday
that he does not see the need to beef up the current macroprudential measures 'for now' as more time is necessary
to assess impacts of monetary easing by major central banks.").
219. Kupiec, supra note 160.
220. See Ben S. Bernanke, Fed. Reserve Chairman, Speech at the Council of Foreign Relations, Washington
D.C.: Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk (March 10, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke200903 Oa.htm; see also Bernanke: Economy 'Still
Far from Fully Recovered' From Crisis, BOND BUYER (USA) (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/121 _69/bernanke-economy- 1038374-1 .html.
221. Id.
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This Article has examined the international prudential regulatory framework, and the
recent efforts to incorporate macroprudential policy into its regulatory system. This Article
has also presented the significant changes the United States has made to its prudential
regulatory regime, with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.222 This Article has analyzed
the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats facing a macroprudential regulation
regulatory system, and the implementations of such a system in the United States.
The question is whether these new regulations will be able to succeed where others
failed since financial systems are inherently prone to crises. How can one set of tools
prevent "unknown unknowns?" The answer is that it cannot do so in a vacuum without
regulatory and political support. Macroprudential regulation has risen to prominence and
is now viewed as the most credible policy and regulatory mechanism for the prevention of
systemic shocks, and the management of any systemic risk in the financial services
industry. This "toolkit," however, has yet to be fully implemented, validated, or fully
enforced by any regulatory regime. 223 Macroprudential regulation's shift from a
theoretical construct to a fully developed and executable regulatory system is at least
several years away.
222. See Written Testimony of Chris Brummer, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center,
Before the House Financial Committee, Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Entities:
Curbing the Extraterritoriality of Dodd-Frank's Derivative Regulation: An Examination of the Swap Jurisdiction
Certainty Act" (Feb. 8, 2012), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-I 12-ba-wstate-
cbrummer-20120208.pdf (describing changes caused by the Dodd-Frank Act, which sought to curb risks in
specific markets).
223. See Anil K. Kashyap et al., The Macroprudential Toolkit, 59 IMF ECON. REv. 145, 146 (2011),
available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/imfer/joumal/v59/n2/pdf/imfer2Ol14a.pdf (explaining that
changes implemented by Basel III reforms only affect capital levels at banks.).
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